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Abstract: 
 
In this paper, we analyze the motivational effects of managing by walking around (MBWA), a 
management style that emphasizes managers’ unstructured visits to the rank and file of the 
company. We do so by conducting a field experiment in the retail division of a medium-sized bank 
located in Latin America. We find that branches increase their sales productivity by a significant 
ten percent in the window following the management visit, an effect that persists for at least a 
month after the event. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that the incentive effect of the 
visit is stronger for those branches located further away from the bank’s headquarters. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we analyze the motivational effects of managing by walking around 
(MBWA). MBWA, popularized by Peters and Waterman’s (1982) “In Search of Excellence,” 
refers to a management style that emphasizes managers’ unstructured visits to the rank and file of 
the company. By leaving the corner office and talking to team members, working with them, or 
helping when needed, managers can boost motivation, build trust, contribute to problem solving, 
and communicate the values of the organization. This practice, whose first systematic application 
is attributed to Hewlett Packard, is frequently cited in management books and credited with 
contributing to the success of firms such as Disney, ServiceMaster and ING-Direct (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982; Heskett, Sasser, and Schlesinger, 1997).  
Understanding whether and in what contexts MBWA is most effective is important in 
helping managers allocate their scarce time. Although the benefits of MBWA are much praised in 
the practitioners’ literature, supported both by anecdotal evidence and by prescription (Peters and 
Austin, 1985; Heskett et al., 1997), the empirical evidence of the returns on this management 
activity is surprisingly scarce and inconclusive. Some studies even find that MBWA has negative 
effects on perceived performance (Tucker and Singer, 2015). We set out to address this problem 
by examining the extent to which a manager’s personal interaction influences the incentives of the 
rank and file. 
We designed a natural field experiment to test the impact of MBWA in collaboration with 
one of the retail divisions of a medium-sized bank located in Latin America. The division that we 
worked with has around 1,000 employees and 79 branches. The experiment allowed us to 
exogenously manipulate the schedule of field visits that the divisional manager made to the 
branches. To stress test the value of MBWA, we implemented our intervention at a time when 
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incentives were strong, as the bank employees were engaged in a series of tournaments that the 
bank ran among its branches with the objective of stimulating sales. From June to November of 
2015, the bank organized every month three tournaments of about 26 branches each. At the end of 
the month, the top three branches in each tournament received a prize to be shared among all 
branch employees. Twice during this six month period branches were randomly assigned to one 
of three groups. Throughout the six months of the tournaments, we randomly planned the visits of 
the retail division manager to the branches. Each branch was visited once, and only once by the 
division manager.  
We selected the timing of the visits in a manner that was orthogonal to branch productivity, 
with geography as the only limitation to randomization (branches were visited in clusters of 
proximity for convenience). Because we observe the performance of all branches before and after 
the randomize control trial, we can identify the causal impact of the implicit incentives derived 
from the manager’s visits. We do this by comparing the daily performance of each branch in the 
dates neighboring the manager’s visit against the performance to be expected absent any effect of 
the visit, thereby controlling for any time-invariant heterogeneity in the teams. 
Our results show that MBWA is an important driver of employee motivation, as the 
manager’s visit results in better team performance in subsequent periods for all of the bank 
branches. We find that branches increase their sales productivity by a significant ten percent in the 
ten-day window immediately following the manager’s visit. Further, this effect seems to persist 
for at least a month after the management walk-around.  
Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that the performance change is stronger or 
more persistent for branches that are more distant from the bank headquarters than for branches 
located closer to headquarters.  
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Our paper makes a significant contribution to the literature in several respects. We 
contribute to the organizational economics literature by analyzing what managers do, focusing on 
one specific activity, the unstructured visits of top managers to the rank and file, and measuring 
its return in terms of increasing the motivation of the line employees. Top managers’ time is an 
extremely scarce resource on which there are significant competing demands. How to allocate this 
time in the most beneficial way for the firm has been a constant concern of management science 
(Drucker, 1966). Mintzberg’s (1973) seminal study called for the analysis of what activities 
constitute the work of a manager. However, the empirical research of what managers do has been 
rare, and mainly focused on styles or sets of actions and associated decisions (Bertrand and Schoar, 
2003; Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton, 2015; Bandiera, Hansen, Prat, and Sadun, 2019).  
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to analyze the incentive effect of 
MBWA. Despite its popularity in management practice and in practitioners’ literature (e.g. Peters 
and Waterman, 1982; Peters and Austin, 1985), the scholarly articles on MBWA are scarce. There 
is a stream of studies with a normative focus, often supported by anecdotal evidence, prescribing 
MBWA to build and communicate organizational values and employee commitment and 
motivation (Simons, 1995; Heskett et al., 1997). The existing empirical evidence is very limited, 
with the notable exception of the literature on safety rounds, or Gemba walks, in the healthcare 
field (see Singer and Tucker, 2014 for a comprehensive review). However, this literature consists 
mainly of case studies (e.g. Amsbary and Staples, 1991; Frankel, Gandhi and Bates, 2003) and 
some field research (e.g. Richardson, Watson, and Wong, 2007; Tucker and Singer, 2015) that 
focuses on the monitoring and problem identifying/solving dimension of MBWA. Further, the 
majority of these works are descriptive in their approach, while those with a quantitative approach 
usually measure the impact of safety walks through surveys asking employees (typically nurses) 
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about their perceptions of safety climate, quality of the output, and value of the program (Frankel 
et al. 2008; Tucker and Singer 2015).2 We show that the unstructured visits to the field that 
constitute the essence of MBWA boost the motivation of the rank and file, resulting in a significant 
increase in sales. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes our setting. We then develop 
a simple model in Section III to motivate the hypotheses that we test. Section IV describes the data 
and how we measure the empirical constructs, and Section V presents the empirical results. Finally, 
Section VI concludes. The detailed derivations of our theoretical results are described in the 
Appendix.  
II. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
For the purpose of this project, we partnered with a mid-sized bank in Latin America with 
over $2 billion in assets. The bank has around 3,000 employees and 170 branches. There are two 
types of branches: those that target the general public (general branches) and those that target the 
retirees leveraging the bank’s appointment as payment agent of the public pension system (service 
centers). Aside from the customer acquisition strategy and the portfolio of customers (service 
centers do not have SME clients), the work of both branch networks has many similarities in terms 
of commercial strategy, especially with respect to sales of financial products to existing customers. 
Our study focuses on the service center network. 
In 2014, the bank decided to introduce a series of tournaments to motivate the branch 
employees to improve their performance. As the bank’s CEO noted “we want to stimulate an urge 
to sell in our employees. The impulse of the tournament should lead the advisor in the branch to 
make that extra call to a customer with a high balance in checking account to acquire a term 
                                               
2 The safety walks studies rarely look at objective outcome measures. One exception is Sexton et al. (2014), which 
looks at turnover although it does not find statistically significant results. 
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deposit, or the teller to offer a debit card to the customer making a big withdrawal highlighting 
the safety and convenience of the plastic money.” To increase the contest’s salience, the retail bank 
director decided to brand it around the Soccer World Cup or Copa Mundial: “soccer is a religion 
here, so we want to leverage the vibe created by the World Cup and bring it to the daily work in 
the branches.” We became actively involved in helping the bank’s top management design the 
tournaments at this time.  
The second edition of the tournament took place in 2015. In each of the six months between 
June and November 2015, the bank organized three independent tournaments in which roughly 26 
service centers competed for multiple prizes. Aggregation of the performance in these 18 monthly 
tournaments served to identify a branch as the World Cup winner at the end of the six months. The 
general branch network simultaneously organized another tournament with very similar rules. 
Nevertheless, we focused our study in the service centers for two reasons. First, the divisional 
manager of this branch network had been recently appointed, therefore amplifying the potential 
signaling value of the visits. Second, the divisional manager of the service centers manifested his 
willingness to accommodate the randomized plan of unstructured visits to the branches. 
In each of the three tournaments that took place every month, centers competed to score 
the maximum number of “goals.” The center scored goals as a function of its level of excess 
performance over a series of commercial targets established in the variable compensation system. 
Generally speaking, the center scored a goal whenever the performance at the end of the month 
was between 100% and 110% of the target, two goals if it was between 110 and 130%, three goals 
between 130 and 150%, and four goals above 150%. The goals were then aggregated for all the 
product dimensions to arrive at the final score that was used to rank the tournament participants. 
(Additional tie-breaking rules were also defined to allocate the prizes in case several branches 
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obtained the same number of goals.) 
In the monthly tournaments, each branch competed only against the other branches 
included in its group (referred to as a “zone,” to echo the zones in the classificatory rounds of 
major international soccer tournaments like the World Cup). Twice in the six month period, we 
randomly allocated each branch to one of three groups of about 26 branches each. The 
randomization of branches aimed to minimize the presence of dynamic incentives (Casas-Arce and 
Martínez-Jerez, 2009). If groups remained the same for the six months, the participants could have 
inferred their relative strength from their performance in the previous tournaments, and their 
subsequent effort would likely have been affected by past performance. For instance, branches 
trailing consistently month after month might have lowered their effort, fearing they had no chance 
of winning in the future. Similar effects are observed, for instance, in RPE incentive plans when 
competition is considered unfair (Frederickson, 1992; Matsumura and Shin, 2006), and in 
budgeting when target levels are very difficult to achieve (Merchant and Manzoni, 1989; Fisher et 
al., 2003). By randomly allocating the branches to new groups, we minimize the influence of such 
dynamic effects. 
A second dimension of our intervention was the planning of the branch visits. We 
randomized the chronological order of the visits within two restrictions. First, geographically close 
branches were to be visited in the same trip to minimize traveling time. Second, the division 
manager reserved a set of dates in his calendar to perform the visits. All 79 branches were visited 
once each in a total of 36 trips over the months of July to October. Notably, the randomization of 
the visits was orthogonal to the lotteries that assigned branches to groups in the tournament. Visits 
were announced to the branches with less than a week advance notice. Although there were slight 
variations from visit to visit, they typically spanned business and non-business hours. While the 
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branch was open to the public, the divisional manager talked to the branch manager and walked 
the facilities observing the employees in action and sustaining short conversations with them. 
When the branch closed, it was the norm to have a town hall meeting in which the divisional 
manager engaged in a conversation with all the employees and emphasized the importance of the 
good work they were doing for the overall success of the bank. 
The rules of each monthly tournament—i.e. the commercial targets—were announced at 
the beginning of each month, shortly after the official announcement of the winners of the prior 
month’s tournaments. Branches could see their performance against targets, their standing in the 
tournament, and the goals that they and other branches had scored via daily updates on the bank’s 
intranet.  
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
III.1 A Simple Model of MBWA and Incentives. 
In order to investigate the motivation effects of the branch visits, we develop a very stylized 
model of the signaling effects of MBWA (Spence, 1973). Consider a manager or leader 𝑙 that 
supervises a branch with (for simplicity) a single employee. Both the manager and employee are 
risk neutral. The value that the employee creates is given by 𝜋(𝑒, 𝜃), where 𝑒 is his effort choice 
at a cost of 𝑐(𝑒) = 𝑒* 2⁄  and 𝜃 is a parameter that captures the productivity of the employee. For 
simplicity, we assume a linear specification, where 𝜋 = 𝜃𝑒 and 𝜃 ∈ {𝜃, 𝜃}, with 0 < 𝜃 < 𝜃. As 
such, 𝜋 and 𝜕𝜋/𝜕𝑒 are both increasing in 𝜃. Hence, when 𝜃 increases, the employee becomes 
more productive and it is optimal to exert a higher effort. Note that the value 𝜋 could be sales, 
profits, or a multidimensional version of value that includes both financial as well as non-financial 
outcomes.  
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Although we refer to 𝜃 as a productivity parameter, there are alternative interpretations of 
the model. In particular, 𝜃 can capture the importance that the manager attaches to the output of 
the employee, the amount of attention that the manager pays to the performance of the employee, 
the amount of monitoring that the manager is likely to exert, or the strength of career concerns in 
the organization, all of which may be (somewhat) unknown to the employee. On the other hand, 
the employee cares about it because his career advancement may depend on those factors, or 
simply because he derives higher utility if the manager is satisfied with his work. In this respect, 
MBWA may therefore serve as a signal about how much the manager cares about the output of 
the employee, or about the fact that the manager is paying attention to what the employee does. 
The manager impacts the employee output through her leadership role. The manager can 
unleash the full productivity potential of the employee by inspiring him via a costly signaling 
action. Following Hermalin (1998), we let the manager move first, and the employee follows the 
leader after observing her action. We assume that 𝜃 is observable by the manager but is unknown 
to the employee. After observing 𝜃, the manager chooses action 𝑎(𝜃) at a cost 𝐾(𝑎) . We can 
think of 𝑎 as the way in which the manager aims to inspire the employee, and could be, for 
instance, a physical visit (MBWA), a phone call, or simply sending no message at all. For 
simplicity, suppose that 𝑎 ∈ {0,1}, and let 𝐾(0) = 0 and 𝐾(1) = 𝐾. Although the employee does 
not observe 𝜃, he can infer its realization (for example, how much the manager actually cares for 
his work) by observing the manager’s action. After observing 𝑎(𝜃), the employee chooses his 
effort level 𝑒. 
The employee receives a fixed salary 𝛼 plus a share 𝛽 ∈ (0,1) of the value created. His 
utility is therefore 𝑈 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋(𝑒, 𝜃) − 𝑐(𝑒) . Likewise, the manager’s salary is linear in the 
employee’s output, 𝑤= = 𝛼= + 𝛽=𝜋. We can write the manager’s utility as 𝑈= = 𝛼= + 𝛽=𝜋 − 𝐾(𝑎). 
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To solve the model, we assume that all parties play a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and we 
rule out the use of weakly dominated strategies.3 We further assume that, in case of multiple 
equilibria, the manager can coordinate with the employee to play the most informative equilibrium, 
with the highest expected output. Let (𝑎∗, 𝑒∗) be the resulting equilibrium choices for the manager 
and the team, and 𝜋∗ the corresponding expected output. To evaluate the effects of the signaling 
action, we compare the expected value 𝜋∗ with the value 𝜋 obtained when no signaling possibility 
by the manager exists and the employee exerts an average effort consistent with his priors of 𝜃, 
about how much the manager cares for his work. We denote the difference by Δ𝜋∗ = 𝜋∗ − 𝜋. 
The employee maximizes his expected utility given the information he has about 𝜃 from 
observing the action of the manager. His problem is therefore: maxC 𝐸(𝛼 + 𝛽𝜋 − 𝑐(𝑒)|𝑎(𝜃)). 
Anticipating the choice of the employee, the manager solves for the optimal ex-ante action: maxG 𝛼= + 𝛽=𝜋 − 𝐾(𝑎) 	𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑒 = 𝑒∗(𝑎). 
The manager would like to communicate the information about 𝜃 to the employee, as this 
helps increase expected output and improve efficiency by allocating high effort when it is most 
productive. However, the manager may be tempted to communicate that 𝜃 = 𝜃 even in the low 
state (when she does not care much about the value created by the employee) in order to induce a 
higher effort from the employee, as the manager does not suffer the cost of the higher effort.4 This 
divergence in preferences with the employee makes it difficult for the manager to sustain an 
informative equilibrium.  
                                               
3 Ruling out weakly dominated strategies eliminates some equilibria that are sustained by unrealistic beliefs. Several 
commonly used equilibrium refinements, such as trembling-hand perfection, preclude the use of such strategies. 
4 A simple example of when the manager would not care about the employee outcome is if the branch is in a non-
strategic location that is not a target of future growth for the bank. 
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The following result shows that increasing the cost of the signaling action leads to higher 
profits as long as the cost is not too high: 
PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that 𝐾KK > 0 is such that an informative equilibrium exists and let 𝐾KK >𝐾K. Then, Δ𝜋∗(𝐾KK) > Δ𝜋∗(𝐾K) > 0. 
When the cost of signaling 𝐾 is zero, the equilibrium involves pooling of both types, as the 
manager has every incentive to pretend that 𝜃 = 𝜃 when indeed 𝜃 = 𝜃, and the cost of doing so is 
nil. As a result, the manager cannot communicate any information in equilibrium. As the cost 𝐾 
increases, the manager finds it less profitable to deviate when 𝜃 = 𝜃, making it possible for the 
manager to communicate some information. As a result, communication becomes more 
informative, and expected output increases. This is the case as long as 𝐾 is not too large. At some 
point, when the cost of the high action increases enough, the cost of signaling is so large that even 
with a 𝜃 = 𝜃 type, the manager would prefer to choose 𝑎 = 0 so the high type pools with the low 
type. At that point, the equilibrium is uninformative. If we characterize the cost of signaling 𝐾 as 
the time it takes the manager to travel to the branch, the message delivered by the manager would 
be uninformative for those branches located so close to headquarters that she could visit them 
without any effort, say on her way to or from work. As the distance to the headquarters increases, 
travel time and, therefore, the cost to the manager of visiting the branch increases. The higher cost 
makes the manager’s presence more valuable to the employees, who correspondingly show an 
increasingly higher effort in response. Finally, if the branch is in a very remote location, with 
difficult communication, and it takes a very long time to reach the site, the costs of the trip may 
outweigh the potential benefits of the visit, and the manager may decide not to deliver the message. 
In that case, the absence of a visit becomes again uninformative to the employees, as the manager 
abstains from visiting them even when their productivity of effort is large. However, because in 
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our setting the manager does decide to visit all the branches, we believe that the cost of signaling 
cannot be that large, and we restrict the results of our model to the parameter space in which we 
obtain an informative equilibrium (even if only partially informative). 
III.2 Hypotheses 
From the previous results, we can derive several hypotheses. First, to the extent that a 
manager’s visit of a branch confers information about the importance of that branch’s performance 
for the bank, we would expect an increase in output in the days following the visit. The first 
hypothesis describes the main effect of MBWA: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 1. When a C-suite manager visits the rank and file, the team members of the front line 
location (the branch) increase their effort. 
 
Besides this average treatment effect, Proposition 1 also predicts heterogeneous responses 
to the managers visit based on the cost of signaling. Because the cost of the manager from visiting 
a branch is higher for branches that are located further away from the bank’s headquarters, we 
expect that the visit would be seen as a stronger message for those branches. As a result, we have 
the following hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2. The incentive effect of the C-suite manager visits increases with the distance of the 
unit from headquarters. 
 
Although the model is static, we can extrapolate that the increasing effect of MBWA with 
distance is likely to manifest both in terms of a stronger short-term response for branches that are 
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farther from headquarters, but also with a response that lasts longer in time for those branches. 
The next section describes the data we use to test these hypotheses. 
IV.  DATA 
 To study the performance responses to MBWA we obtained sales information by branch 
from the market intelligence department of the bank. They extracted the data directly from the 
transactional systems of the bank. The retail division provided us with the census of branches.  
In the definition of the dependent variable, we aimed to echo the behaviors that the bank’s 
management wanted to promote. The performance metric of the tournament was the number of 
goals or points scored as a function of the product sales targets defined for each unit. However, as 
goals were scored in discrete intervals of sales relative to targets, their sensitivity to changes in 
effort was low, particularly at the daily level (most of the goals were scored in the second half of 
the month). To ensure that our dependent variable was sensitive to the sales effort of branches and 
employees over windows as short as a day, we decided to use underlying sales rather than goals 
as the dependent variable. As products typically have different ranges of sales, in constructing our 
sales performance variable we first normalize each product sales number by the population mean 
and standard deviation. Then, we weight sales by their scoring power, i.e., the number of goals 
that can be obtained by successfully selling the product. 
In our empirical analyses we consider three types of event-time windows. First, we define 
the Event date as the month or the day of the divisional manager visit to the branch. Because the 
visit is announced a few days in advance (at most a week before according to the divisional 
manager), the Pre window identifies the month or the 5-business day period immediately 
preceding the event window. Finally, as we expect the incentive effect of MBWA to persist after 
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the divisional manager visit takes place, we define the Post windows as a series of diverse length 
periods after the event.   
To test whether the incentive effect of MBWA is a function of the remoteness of the branch, 
we search for the shortest driving distance between a branch and the bank headquarters using 
Google Maps (Dist).  
 Summary descriptive statistics for each of the variables can be found in Table 1. Table 2 
presents the schedule of management visits to the branches. The bulk of the visits happened 
between July and September with eight visits spanning to October 2015.  
V.  RESULTS 
V.1 The incentive effect of the manager visit. 
In this section, we analyze the changes in the sales productivity of branches around the 
time of the divisional manager visit. We do this by comparing the performance in the window of 
the visit against the performance expected if the visit had not happened. To build the expectation 
of performance, we use the average sales performance of the branch or employee and adjust it for 
time-specific circumstances such as day of the week, time trends, and whether the observation 
occurs during the time of the tournament.  
We identify the average incentive effect of the manager visit by running the following 
regression: 
Performanceit = αi + β1 Tournamentt + β2 Preit + β2 Eventit + β3 Postit + γ Xt + uit ,       [1] 
where i denotes a branch; t is the time period (month or day); α is a branch fixed-effect 
(representing human capital, demographics or market characteristics); Tournament is a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 in the months where the sales tournament is in effect and zero 
otherwise; Event, Pre, and Post are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation 
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occurs in the period (month or day) of the visit, the window immediately before, and the window 
immediately after the visit; and Xt is a vector of variables capturing time effects, such as trends, or 
the impact of the day of the week or the week of the month.  
We start the analysis by observing monthly performance because that is the time horizon 
of the branch incentives. Table 3 panel A presents the results for the monthly regressions. It shows 
a strong and significant bump in sales productivity in the month of the visit. The magnitude of the 
incentive effect is similar to that of the tournament. Further, the effect persists at a similar level 
for at least two months, and it only drops significantly for a three-month window (models (3) and 
(4)). Interestingly, there is no significant increase in sales in the month prior to the month of the 
visit, indicating that the increase in sales starts closer to the visit itself. 
To understand better the causal link between the management visit and the sales, we graph 
the branches’ abnormal sales volumes in 5-day event-time windows around the day of the visit. 
Figure 1 presents the coefficients of a regression model similar to [1] with twelve pre-visit window 
and twelve post-visit window dummies for the corresponding 5-day windows around the day of 
the visit. It is possible to appreciate that sales start being abnormally high the week before the visit, 
suggesting an immediate reaction to the announcement of the upcoming visit. Abnormal sales peak 
the day of the visit, and remain significantly high for up to a month and a half after the visit. 
Table 3 Panel B presents the results for the daily data in a regression framework. Many of 
the same patterns as in Panel A arise here: there is a strong event-day effect of similar magnitude 
to the effect of the tournament, and persistence of the incentive effect for the following five to six 
weeks. There is also a significant and positive increase—although roughly half in size—in sales 
productivity in the days leading up to the divisional manager’s visit, consistent with growing 
excitement in the branch in anticipation of the visit at a daily but not at a monthly level.  
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In summary, the evidence presented in this section suggests a strong incentive effect of the 
divisional manager’s unstructured branch visits. This effect results in an increase in the sales 
productivity of the branch and persists well beyond the day of the visit. Although there is a slight 
increase in sales in anticipation of the visit, the short length of the period and the small magnitude 
of the effect vis-à-vis the increase observed during and after the visit suggest that the physical 
presence of the divisional manager is what triggers the branches’ additional commercial effort. 
Moreover, because the timing of the visit is exogenously determined well in advance of its 
occurrence, we can safely discard the possibility that the observed relationship is simply the effect 
of management choosing to visit the branches having the most success in the tournament at the 
time. 
V.2 The effect of branch distance to HQ on the heterogeneous responses to the manager's visit. 
In this section, we study whether and how the change in sales productivity displayed by 
the branches in response to the divisional manager’s visit varies as a function of the driving 
distance between the branch and the headquarters that house the office of the divisional manager.  
To analyze the impact of distance on the incentive effect of MBWA, we estimate 
regressions as follows: 
Performanceit = αi + β1 Tournamentt + β2 Preit + β3 Eventit + β4 Postit + β5 Eventit * Disti 
+ β6 Postit * Disti + γ Xt + uit , 
where Dist is the mean adjusted driving distance in kilometers between the branch and the bank 
headquarters and the remaining variables are defined as in [1]. Note that the variable Dist only 
appears in interactions with Event and Post. This is because the driving distance is time invariant 
for each branch and therefore it is subsumed in the branch fixed effect αi. The coefficients of 
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interest in this section are β5 and β6, which measure the extent to which the performance 
improvement triggered by the manager’s visit changes with the driving distance. 
Table 4 Panel A shows the results for the monthly regressions. The rise in sales the month 
of the visit is comparable to that of Table 3, and it is similar for all branches regardless of their 
distance to headquarters as suggested by the coefficient on the interaction between the month of 
the visit and driving distance. The same patterns are observed for subsequent months. The 
generally insignificant coefficients on the interactions between driving distance and the windows 
post-visit fail to show that, as we predicted, the incentive effect of MBWA is larger or more 
persistent the more distant a branch is from headquarters.  
Table 4 Panel B presents the results for the daily branch regressions. Here we can observe 
with more granularity the effect of driving distance on the persistence of the incentive effect of 
MBWA. Again, the coefficient on the interaction between the day of the visit and driving distance 
suggests that the incentive effect the day of the visit is similar for all branches. The generally 
insignificant coefficients of the interactions between driving distance and the post-visit windows 
suggest a similar persistence of the incentive effect for all branches regardless of their distance 
from headquarters.  
In summary, the evidence presented in this section fails to show that the incentive effect of 
MBWA is larger or more persistent for employees who work further away from where top 
management is located.  
V.3 Robustness tests. 
Table 5 presents the results of placebo tests we conducted to assess the robustness of the 
results of our main empirical analyses. Our empirical analyses, as specified in Table 3, rely on the 
premise that any significant increase in sales around the time of the management visit is 
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attributable to the motivational effect of the visit. While the randomization of the visits schedule 
gives us confidence on our identification strategy, we obtain further comfort in this section by 
falsifying the dates of the visit and comparing the patter of abnormal sales around the days of the 
visits and the falsified dates. Thus, we run the same econometric specifications as in column 4 of 
Table 3, but we define the event windows around the six months before, six months after, and 
twelve months after the action visit of the divisional manager to the branch. 
The results of these placebo analyses are presented in Table 5. Although some of the 
coefficients are significant—notably that of the 10 to 30-day window in Panel A and the 1-month 
window in Panel B for the placebos 6-months before and 12-months after the visit—we do not 
observe the same consistent patterns as those exhibited in Table 3. Furthermore, the size of the 
coefficients in the placebo tests are generally considerably smaller than those derived from the 
actual treatment. 
Thus, the evidence presented in this section reinforces the conclusion that the patterns of 
abnormal sales around the visit of the divisional manager are not spurious but caused by the 
motivational effects of the visit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyze the incentive effect of management by walking around (MBWA), 
a management style characterized by unstructured visits of top management to the rank and file. 
In collaboration with a medium-sized bank in Latin America, we conducted a field experiment in 
which we randomized the calendar of branch visits by the manager of a retail division of the bank. 
Each branch was visited once (and only once) by the divisional manager during a six-month-long 
sales stimulation program. We find that branches increase their sales productivity by a significant 
ten percent in the window following the management visit, an effect that persists for at least a 
  18 
month after the event. Contrary to our expectations, the incentive effect of the visit is not stronger 
nor more persistent for those branches located further away from the bank’s headquarters, which 
houses the office of the divisional manager. 
Our study shows the existence of a performance effect of unstructured management visits 
to the field, which is an important contribution given the lack of prior empirical evidence. 
Furthermore, the practical relevance of these findings is even more important at a time when 
competitive strategies seem to be focused on analytics and artificial intelligence, relegating the 
human component to a secondary role. Our evidence suggests that simply “managing by numbers” 
is unlikely to be enough to obtain optimal results, and points to the importance of personal 
interactions in the motivation of the workforce. 
We interpret that the results that we find are caused by the motivational effect of employees 
feeling worthy of management attention. It is also plausible that branch employees may have felt 
that their work was monitored more closely after the visit; they may have realized that further 
career opportunities might be available for good performance than they previously thought; or the 
divisional manager may have imparted useful tips on how to improve performance. However, 
anecdotal evidence from pre and post RCT field interviews suggest that an important mechanism 
driving the increase in sales is the increased employee motivation stemming from their perception, 
induced by the visit, that top management cares about their work. In the words of the service center 
divisional manager, “the branch employees were really excited to hear that I was visiting their 
branch and spending time with them. Some of the branches even organized a party with decorations 
and snacks or a luncheon for my visit.” Furthermore, the tone of the visits tended to be informal, 
and not focused on reviewing and assessing performance or working practices. Moreover, the short 
duration of the visits makes it unlikely for the divisional manager to significantly impart new skills 
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that would drive a significant increase in sales, an explanation that cannot account for the fact that 
the increase in performance appears already in anticipation of the visit. 
Nevertheless, we cannot completely rule out that the effect is caused by the learning of new 
best practices transmitted by the divisional manger or the elimination of dysfunctional behavior 
due to the perceived increase monitoring by headquarters. Because the precise mechanism driving 
our results cannot be scientifically contrasted, we preferred to leave our theoretical interpretation 
open and leave for future research the study of the effects of these different mechanisms. RCTs 
with different designs may help to shed light to this question. The manager may alternate visits 
during opening hours, more prone to increase the learning of the rank and file, with visits during 
non-commercial hours, better suited for an inspirational address. Also, the manager may deliver 
an inspirational message to some branches and a more hierarchical and compliance-oriented 
message to other branches. Another possible next step in the inquiry of this phenomenon is the 
development of a more complete contingency theory that would allow us to understand how the 
impact of MBWA is affected by different circumstances, such as the frequency of the manager 
visits, the hierarchical distance between the manger and the rank and file, the nature of the 
decentralized decisions, the culture of the firm, the manager’s leadership style, or the 
characteristics of the field employees. Finally, this research could also be extended to address 
alternative managerial actions to understand the relative value of all the things that managers do 
and improve our understanding of how they drive firm performance. 
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APPENDIX: PROOFS 
This appendix provides the formal derivation of the result in Section III. 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Let 𝜇  denote the ex-ante probability of 𝜃 = 𝜃 , and 𝐸𝜃  the ex-ante 
expected productivity. After observing the leader’s action 𝑎(𝜃), team members will form beliefs 
about 𝜃, where ?̂?(𝑎) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏S𝜃 = 𝜃T𝑎U ∈ [0,1], 𝐸(𝜃|𝑎) denotes the expectation of 𝜃 conditional 
on the observed action of the leader, which is increasing in ?̂?(𝑎). In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, 
such beliefs have to follow Bayes’ rule. Moreover, from the employee’s first-order condition, we 
have that 𝑒X∗(𝑎) = 𝛽𝐸(𝜃|𝑎). Denote 𝑒∗ = 𝛽𝜃 and 𝑒∗ = 𝛽𝜃 the optimal effort choices when the 
employee knows the state of the world is 𝜃 and 𝜃, respectively. 
There are three types of equilibria: pooling, fully separating, and partially separating 
equilibria. A pooling equilibrium in which 𝑎∗ = 0 for all 𝜃 always exists in which the employee’s 
expectations satisfy 𝐸(𝜃|𝑎) = 𝐸𝜃 for all 𝑎. This equilibrium is completely uninformative for the 
employee. (Likewise, there may also exist a pooling equilibrium with 𝑎∗ = 1 for all 𝜃 in which 
the employee’s expectations satisfy 𝐸(𝜃|1) = 𝐸𝜃 and 𝐸(𝜃|0) = 𝜃. However, we do not consider 
it because the manager prefers the pooling equilibrium with 𝑎∗ = 0, as it yields the same expected 
output without incurring the signaling cost.) 
In all other equilibria, in which both 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑎 = 1 are played in equilibrium with 
positive probability, 𝐸(𝜃|𝑎) (and hence 𝑒X∗(𝑎)) must be (weakly) increasing in 𝑎. Otherwise, if 𝐸(𝜃|𝑎) were decreasing in 𝑎, the leader would prefer to set 𝑎 = 0 for all 𝜃, as doing so is less 
costly, and moreover convinces the team members that 𝐸(𝜃|𝑎) is higher, encouraging them to 
exert higher effort and increase expected output. 
In order to sustain such an informative equilibrium, the following incentive compatibility 
(IC) constraints for the manager must be satisfied: 
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𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U − 𝐾 ≥ 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U ≥ 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U − 𝐾. 
Notice that both these constraints cannot be binding at the same time because 𝜃 > 𝜃. As a result, 
we cannot have indifference between 𝑎 = 0 and 𝑎 = 1 for both types at the same time. It follows 
that we can have either a fully separating equilibrium (FSE), in which 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 0 and 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 1, 
and two partially separating equilibria (denoted PSE1 and PSE2), in which one of the two types 
mixes between the two signals. In PSE1, 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 1  with probability 𝑝 , 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 0  with 
probability 1 − 𝑝 , and 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 1  with probability 1. In PSE2, 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 0  with probability 1, 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 1 with probability 𝑞, and 𝑎∗S𝜃U = 0 with probability 1 − 𝑞. 
 Consider FSE first. The equilibrium expected output is 𝜋∗ = 𝜇𝜋S𝑒∗, 𝜃U + (1 −𝜇)𝜋S𝑒∗, 𝜃U, and the manager’s expected utility is 𝑈\∗ = 𝛽\𝜋∗ − 𝜇𝐾. This equilibrium exists for any 𝐾 ∈ ]𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U, 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U^, as the IC constraint for 𝜃 fails when 𝐾 > 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U, and 
the IC constraint for 𝜃 fails when 𝐾 < 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U. Notice that 𝜋∗ is independent of 𝐾 under this 
equilibrium. 
 Consider now PSE1. Because the manager mixes when 𝜃 = 𝜃 , he must be indifferent 
between the two actions: 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U = 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U − 𝐾. Bayesian updating also requires 
that 𝐸(𝜃|0) = 𝜃, so 𝑒∗(0) = 𝑒∗, and 𝑒∗(1) ∈ ]𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃), 𝑒∗^. Therefore, this equilibrium exists for 
any 𝐾 ∈ ]𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃) − 𝑒∗U, 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U^ , as we cannot satisfy the indifference condition 
outside of this range. Furthermore, at 𝐾 = 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U we must have 𝐸(𝜃|1) = 𝜃 and 𝑒∗(1) =𝑒∗ (i.e. the fully separating equilibrium), while at 𝐾 = 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃) − 𝑒∗U we have 𝐸(𝜃|1) = 𝐸𝜃 
and 𝑒∗(1) = 𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃) (i.e. the pooling equilibrium). The equilibrium expected output in this case is  
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𝜋∗ = 𝜇𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U + (1 − 𝜇)]𝑝𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U + (1 − 𝑝)𝜋S𝑒∗, 𝜃U^. 
If we substitute for 𝑒∗(1) from the indifference condition, it follows after some algebra that: 𝜕𝜋∗𝜕𝐾 = 1𝛽= _𝐸𝜃𝜃 − 1` > 0. 
Therefore, expected output is increasing in 𝐾. Moreover, the expected output under PSE1 lies 
between that of the pooling and the fully separating equilibria. 
Finally, consider PSE2. Because the manager mixes when 𝜃 = 𝜃, he must be indifferent 
between the two actions: 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U − 𝐾 = 𝛽=𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U. Bayesian updating also requires 
that 𝐸(𝜃|1) = 𝜃, so 𝑒∗(1) = 𝑒∗, and 𝑒∗(0) ∈ ]𝑒∗, 𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃)^. Therefore, this equilibrium exists for 
any 𝐾 ∈ a𝛽=𝜃 b𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃)c , 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗Ud , as we cannot satisfy the indifference condition 
outside of this range. Furthermore, at 𝐾 = 𝛽=𝜃S𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗U we must have 𝐸(𝜃|0) = 𝜃 and 𝑒∗(0) =𝑒∗ (i.e. the fully separating equilibrium), while at 𝐾 = 𝛽=𝜃 b𝑒∗ − 𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃)c we have 𝐸(𝜃|0) = 𝐸𝜃 
and 𝑒∗(0) = 𝑒∗(𝐸𝜃) (i.e. the pooling equilibrium). The equilibrium expected output in this case is  𝜋∗ = 𝜇]𝑞𝜋S𝑒∗(1), 𝜃U + (1 − 𝑞)𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U^ + (1 − 𝜇)𝜋S𝑒∗(0), 𝜃U. 
If we substitute for 𝑒∗(1) from the indifference condition, it follows after some algebra that: 𝜕𝜋∗𝜕𝐾 = 1𝛽= e1 − 𝐸𝜃𝜃 f > 0. 
Therefore, expected output is also increasing in 𝐾. Furthermore, as with PSE1, the expected output 
under PSE2 lies between that of the pooling and the fully separating equilibria. 
Because we select the most informative equilibrium, with the highest expected output, it 
follows that the equilibrium outcome must be pooling for 𝐾 ∈ ]0, 𝐾^, PSE1 or PSE2 for	𝐾 ∈]𝐾, 𝐾^, FSE for	𝐾 ∈ ]𝐾, 𝐾g^, and pooling for 𝐾 > 𝐾g. The proposition then follows from the fact 
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that expected output 𝜋∗ for PSE1 and PSE2 is increasing in 𝐾 and between the expected output of 
pooling and FSE. Therefore, it is (weakly) increasing for all 𝐾 ≤ 𝐾g. ∎ 
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Figure 1. Abnormal Sales Performance Surrounding the Divisional Manager Visit 
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TABLE 1. Summary statistics (79 unique branches) 
       
  Observations mean sd min max 
Weighted Normalized Performance (monthly)  948   (0.00)  8.27   (16.18)  34.01  
Weighted Normalized Performance (daily) 19,355   (0.00)  7.94   (13.63)  63.81  
Drive Distance  79   289.4   385.1   2.8   1,254.0  
      
Notes: This table reports the mean, standard deviation and main order statistics of the variables used in this study. Weighted                   
Normalized Performance is the sum of the individual product sales performed by a branch normalized by the population mean and standard 
deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets the monthly sales target for that product; 
Drive Distance is the shortest driving distance between a branch and the bank headquarters calculated using Google Maps.  
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Table 2. Frequency of Visits per month (June-November 2015) 
     
 
Number of 
Visits    
July 22    
August 24    
September 25    
October 8    
TOTAL 79    
     
Notes: This table reports the number of visits per month made by the Retail Division Manager of the 
Bank during the experiment period. The chronological order of the visits was randomly determined with 
two restrictions: (1) geographically close branches were to be visited in the same trip to minimize 
traveling time, and (2) the division manager reserved a set of dates in his calendar to perform the visits.   
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Table 3 Panel A. Monthly Performance, Impact of the Visit 
     
     
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
          
Tournament 2.121*** 1.902*** 2.185*** 1.892*** 
 (0.294) (0.336) (0.362) (0.345) 
1-month Pre-visit Window 0.00569 0.332 0.129 0.269 
 (0.386) (0.394) (0.418) (0.418) 
Month of the Visit 1.585*** 1.942*** 1.755*** 1.861*** 
 (0.440) (0.460) (0.491) (0.498) 
1-month Post-visit Window 1.361***   1.649*** 
 (0.381)   (0.524) 
2-month Post-visit Window  1.508***   
  (0.427)   
3-month Post-visit Window   0.870  
   (0.532)  
Month 2 After Visit    1.151* 
    (0.671) 
Month 3 After Visit    -0.324 
    (0.611) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.783*** -0.813*** -0.829*** -0.795*** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.076) (0.076) 
Service Center Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 948 948 948 948 
R-squared 0.842 0.844 0.842 0.844 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch monthly sales performance during the year when the RCT took place. The 
dependent variable, Weighted Normalized Performance, is the sum of the individual product sales performed by a branch normalized by 
the population mean and standard deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets the 
monthly sales target for that product; Tournament is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sales tournament is running during 
the month of the observation and 0 otherwise; 1-month Pre-visit Window, Month of the Visit, 1-month Post-visit Window, and Month 2(3) 
After Visit are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the month prior to, the month of, or the first, second, or 
third month after the visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise; 2(3)-month Post-visit Window are dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the 2- or 3-month period after the visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. 
Clustered standard errors (branch level) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 Panel B. Daily Performance, Impact of the Visit 
     
     
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
          
Tournament 1.273*** 1.228*** 1.109*** 1.106*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.174) (0.173) 
5-day Pre-visit Window 0.793** 0.836** 0.979*** 0.979*** 
 (0.361) (0.363) (0.364) (0.364) 
Day of the Visit 1.327*** 1.371*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 
 (0.420) (0.423) (0.428) (0.428) 
5-day Post-visit Window 0.709**   0.897*** 
 (0.270)   (0.294) 
10-day Post-visit Window  0.894***   
  (0.244)   
30-day Post-visit Window   0.881***  
   (0.197)  
Days 6 to 10 Post-visit    1.180*** 
    (0.318) 
Days 11 to 30 Post-visit    0.802*** 
    (0.194) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.594*** -0.594*** -0.600*** -0.600*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Fixed Effects:     
Service Center  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week of the Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 19,355 19,355 19,355 19,355 
R-squared 0.623 0.623 0.624 0.624 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch daily sales performance during the year when the RCT took place. The dependent 
variable, Weighted Normalized Performance, is the sum of the individual product daily sales performed by a branch normalized by the 
population mean and standard deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets the monthly 
sales target for that product; Tournament is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sales tournament is running during the day of 
the observation and 0 otherwise; Day of the Visit, 5-day Pre-visit Window, 5(10)(30)-day Post-visit Window, and Days 6(11) to 10(30) Post-
visit are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the day of, or in the periods defined as a function of the day of 
the visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. 
Clustered standard errors (by branch) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Panel A. Monthly Performance, Impact of the Visit and Distance Effect 
     
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
          
Tournament 2.122*** 1.899*** 2.187*** 1.964*** 
 (0.294) (0.338) (0.359) (0.332) 
1-month Pre-visit Window 0.005 0.333 0.129 0.223 
 (0.386) (0.395) (0.412) (0.405) 
Month of the Visit 1.585*** 1.942*** 1.756*** 1.818*** 
 (0.436) (0.461) (0.491) (0.491) 
Drive Distance* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 
        Month of the Visit (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
1-month Post-visit Window 1.362***   1.610*** 
 (0.381)   (0.513) 
Drive Distance* 0.000   0.000 
       1-month Post-visit Window (0.001)   (0.001) 
2-month Post-visit Window   1.508***   
  (0.421)   
Drive Distance*  0.001   
       2-month Post-visit Window  (0.001)   
3-month Post-visit Window   0.873  
   (0.531)  
Drive Distance*   0.000  
       3-month Post-visit Window   (0.001)  
Month 2 After Visit    1.123* 
    (0.654) 
Drive Distance*    0.001 
       Month 2 After Visit    (0.001) 
Month 3 After Visit    -0.327 
    (0.614) 
Drive Distance*    -0.001 
       Month 3 After Visit    (0.002) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.783*** -0.813*** -0.830*** -0.799*** 
 (0.066) (0.069) (0.076) (0.076) 
Service Center Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 948 948 948 948 
R-squared 0.843 0.844 0.842 0.845 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch monthly sales performance during the year when the RCT took place and analyzes 
whether the impact of the visit is contingent on the distance of the branch from the bank headquarters. The dependent variable, Weighted 
Normalized Performance, is the sum of the individual product sales performed by a branch normalized by the population mean and standard 
deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets the monthly sales target for that product; 
Tournament is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sales tournament is running during the month of the observation and 0 
otherwise; 1-month Pre-visit Window, Month of the Visit, 1-month Post-visit Window, and Month 2(3) After Visit are dummy variables that 
take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the month prior to, the month of, or the first, second, or third month after the visit of the division 
manager to the branch and 0 otherwise; 2(3)-month Post-visit Window are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs 
the 2- or 3-month period after the visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. Drive Distance is the mean adjusted shortest 
driving distance between a branch and the bank headquarters calculated using Google Maps. “*” denotes interaction between two variables. 
Clustered standard errors (by branch) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 Panel B. Daily Performance, Impact of the Visit and Distance Effect 
     
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
          
Tournament 1.273*** 1.229*** 1.109*** 1.107*** 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.174) (0.174) 
5-day Pre-visit Window 0.792** 0.836** 0.979*** 0.979*** 
 (0.361) (0.363) (0.364) (0.364) 
Day of the Visit 1.327*** 1.370*** 1.514*** 1.514*** 
 (0.419) (0.422) (0.428) (0.428) 
Drive Distance* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
       Day of the Visit (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
5-day Post-visit Window  0.708**   0.897*** 
 (0.271)   (0.295) 
Drive Distance* -0.000   -0.000 
       5-day Post-visit Window (0.001)   (0.001) 
10-day Post-visit Window   0.894***   
  (0.245)   
Drive Distance*  -0.000   
       10-day Post-visit Window  (0.001)   
30-day Post-visit Window    0.881***  
   (0.199)  
Drive Distance*   -0.000  
       30-day Post-visit Window   (0.000)  
Days 6 to 10 Post-visit    1.181*** 
    (0.319) 
Drive Distance*    -0.000 
       Days 6 to 10 Post-visit    (0.001) 
Days 11 to 30 Post-visit    0.802*** 
    (0.194) 
Drive Distance*    -0.000 
       Days 11 to 30 Post-visit    (0.00) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.594*** -0.594*** -0.601*** -0.600*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Fixed Effects:     
Service Center  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Week of the Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations 19,355 19,355 19,355 19,355 
R-squared 0.623 0.623 0.624 0.624 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch daily sales performance during the year when the RCT took place and analyzes 
whether the impact of the visit is contingent on the distance of the branch from the bank headquarters. The dependent variable, Weighted 
Normalized Performance, is the sum of the individual product daily sales performed by a branch normalized by the population mean and 
standard deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets the monthly sales target for that 
product; Tournament is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the sales tournament is running during the day of the observation and 0 
otherwise; Day of the Visit, 5-day Pre-visit Window, 5(10)(30)-day Post-visit Window, and Days 6(11) to 10(30) Post-visit are dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the day of, or in the periods defined as a function of the day of the visit of the 
division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. Drive Distance is the mean adjusted shortest driving distance between a branch and the 
bank headquarters calculated using Google Maps. “*” denotes interaction between two variables. 
Clustered standard errors (by branch) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Panel A. Placebo Analysis. Monthly Performance, Impact of the Visit 
    
    
PLACEBO TIME 
6 months before 
the visit 
6 months after 
the visit 
12 months after 
the visit 
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
        
Tournament -2.884*** -1.289*** 1.149*** 
 (0.662) (0.251) (0.183) 
1-month Pre-visit Window 0.357 0.478 -0.277 
 (0.506) (0.307) (0.289) 
Month of the Visit 0.917 0.504 -0.266 
 (0.715) (0.310) (0.295) 
Month 1 After Visit 1.367* 0.551 0.704*** 
 (0.757) (0.332) (0.263) 
Month 2 After Visit 0.920 0.459* 0.367 
 (0.728) (0.270) (0.245) 
Month 3 After Visit 0.465 0.350 -0.0444 
 (0.511) (0.265) (0.221) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.827*** -0.200*** -0.205*** 
 (0.081) (0.042) (0.031) 
Service Center Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 948 948 948 
R-squared 0.829 0.856 0.865 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch monthly sales performance during the year of the placebo 
RCT period. The placebo periods are defined in event time where the event period occurs 6 months prior, 6 
months after, and 12 months after the month of the actual visit of the division manager to the branch. The 
dependent variable, Weighted Normalized Performance, is the sum of the individual product sales performed by a 
branch normalized by the population mean and standard deviation for each product and then multiplied by the 
number of goals scored if the branch meets the monthly sales target for that product; Tournament is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 if the event time of the observation relative to the placebo visit coincides with 
the event time of the sales tournament relative to the actual visit and 0 otherwise; 1-month Pre-visit Window, 
Month of the Visit, 1-month Post-visit Window, and Month 2(3) After Visit are dummy variables that take the 
value of 1 if the observation occurs the month prior to, the month of, or the first, second, or third month after the 
placebo visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise; 2(3)-month Post-visit Window are dummy 
variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the 2- or 3-month period after the placebo visit of the 
division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. 
Clustered standard errors (by branch) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Panel B. Placebo Analysis. Daily Performance, Impact of the Visit 
    
    
PLACEBO TIME 
6 months before 
the visit 
6 months after the 
visit 
12 months after 
the visit 
VARIABLES 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
Weighted 
Normalized 
Performance 
        
Tournament -0.967*** -2.010*** 0.963*** 
 (0.292) (0.165) (0.102) 
5-day Pre-visit Window 0.726* 0.598* 0.212 
 (0.413) (0.308) (0.185) 
Day of the Visit -0.559 0.171 0.113 
 (0.599) (0.406) (0.320) 
5-day Post-visit Window 0.331 0.429 0.019 
 (0.350) (0.343) (0.184) 
Days 6 to 10 Post-visit 0.665 0.488 0.079 
 (0.431) (0.296) (0.194) 
Days 11 to 30 Post-visit 0.510* -0.0867 0.422*** 
 (0.303) (0.247) (0.114) 
Monthly linear time trend -0.576*** -0.434*** -0.287*** 
 (0.049) (0.030) (0.022) 
Fixed Effects:    
Service Center  Yes Yes Yes 
Week of the Month Yes Yes Yes 
Day of the Week Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 19,355 19,671 19,671 
R-squared 0.619 0.557 0.553 
Notes: This table reports OLS regressions of the branch daily sales performance during the year of the placebo RCT. 
The placebo periods are defined in event time where the event occurs 6 months prior, 6 months after, and 12 months 
after the day of the actual visit of the division manager to the branch. The dependent variable, Weighted Normalized 
Performance, is the sum of the individual product daily sales performed by a branch normalized by the population 
mean and standard deviation for each product and then multiplied by the number of goals scored if the branch meets 
the monthly sales target for that product; Tournament is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the event time 
of the observation relative to the placebo visit coincides with the event time of the sales tournament relative to the 
actual visit and 0 otherwise; Day of the Visit, 5-day Pre-visit Window, 5(10)(30)-day Post-visit Window, and Days 
6(11) to 10(30) Post-visit are dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the observation occurs the day of, or in the 
periods defined as a function of the day of the placebo visit of the division manager to the branch and 0 otherwise. 
Clustered standard errors (by branch) in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
